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New Approaches to Cross-Strait Integration 
and Its Impacts on Taiwan’s Domestic 
Economy: An Emerging “Chaiwan”? 
Gordon C. K. Cheung 
Abstract: Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan and Presidential elections in January 
and March 2008 respectively re-orientated cross-Strait relations from 
hostility to co-operation. On 4 November 2008, Chen Yunlin, head of 
the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), and 
Chiang Pin-kun (Jiang Bingkun), chairman of Taiwan’s Straits Exchange 
Foundation (SEF), meeting in the Second Chiang-Chen Talks in Taiwan, 
took a historical step in the further development of cross-Strait relations. 
Agreements were signed on direct air and sea transport, postal services 
and food-safety security. On 22 December 2009, the Fourth Chiang-
Chen Talks took place in Taizhong and more substantial and technical 
agreements were signed on agriculture, inspection/ accreditation and 
fisheries. It seems that continuous integration between China and Tai-
wan is inevitable. To address the implications of this process for Tai-
wan’s domestic economy, four dimensions of the current cross-Strait 
relationship are scrutinized: guanxi, plutocracy, legalism and the idea of a 
Chinese Common Market. It is argued that in order to intensify eco-
nomic co-operation across the Taiwan Strait, more institutionalization of 
the cross-Strait relationship must be brought about. 
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Introduction 
When Sky News reported on the flooding in Taiwan and south China on 
16 August 2009, Taiwan’s news was put together with China’s, and the 
pictures of the flooding in southern Taiwan were intermingled with shots 
of flooding in the southern part of China as well (Sky News 2009). To 
the general public, it was all just news coverage of areas affected by nat-
ural disasters, but for those who are concerned with cross-Strait relations, 
the implications were enormous: it appeared that the economic integra-
tion between Taiwan and China had gradually moulded the two nations 
together and that people increasingly thought there was no difference at 
all between China and Taiwan! 
It is in this direction that the discussion of rapid integration between 
China and Taiwan has become an imperative, particularly with reference 
to studying the neologism of “Chaiwan” in order to diagnose the dynam-
ics and changes of cross-Strait relations. The term “Chaiwan” (coined by 
combining the words “China” and “Taiwan”) was first created by the 
Korean media in 2007 (Yazhou Zhoukan 2009: 26). The Korean govern-
ment was afraid of the integration between Taiwan and China in the 
electronics industry and of the technological know-how developed by 
them, which may eventually threaten Korea’s leadership in the electronic 
industry. Of course, whenever the term “Chaiwan” is used, it does not 
necessarily mean that cross-Strait relations are going to be smooth and 
economic and that political relations can be developed without any diffi-
culty. On the contrary, cross-Strait relations will be conditioned and 
modified in the future by the economic integration between China and 
Taiwan. The neologism is an attempt at providing a way of seeing or 
generating a platform for further academic discussion and debate. In a 
similar fashion, it is like “Chimerica”, which was coined by Niall Fergu-
son to describe the future relations between the United States of Amer-
ica and China. It hardly suggests that the USA and China will be 
harmonious, though! It may just indicate that they need each other in an 
interdependent way. Yet I would argue that the current economic co-
operation across the Taiwan Strait is embedded with a number of 
uncertainties, such that a new approach is necessary to place the current 
economic and political relations in a perspective enabling one to under-
stand the possible future direction of the cross-Strait relationship. 
Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan and Presidential elections in January and 
March 2008 respectively re-orientated cross-Strait relations from hostility 
to co-operation. On 12 January 2008, the Kuomintang (KMT) (Guomin-
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dang) hugely defeated the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) by win-
ning 81 seats to 27 (out of 113 seats in total). More importantly, Ma 
Ying-jeou (Ma Yingjiu), the KMT presidential candidate, won a landslide 
victory during the presidential election on 22 March 2008. He obtained 
7.65 million (58.45 per cent) of the votes, while his counterpart, Frank 
Hsieh (Xie Changting), “only” won 5.45 million (41.55 per cent). In his 
inaugural address on 20 May 2008, Ma Ying-jeou (Ma Yingjiu), President 
of Taiwan, said: “I sincerely hope that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait 
can seize this historic opportunity to achieve peace and co-prosperity” 
(China Post 2008). His presidency not only broke the political stalemate in 
cross-Strait relations, but also put the KMT back onto the front stage of 
Taiwan’s politics – very likely creating another problem that will be dis-
cussed in the third section of this paper.1  
The first regular direct flight since 1949 was launched on 4 July 
2008, operated by China Southern Airlines from Guangzhou, mainland 
China to Taibei. Cross-Strait social development is expected to recover 
gradually. Yet after a year in office, Ma’s leadership was brought into 
question because of external and internal factors. On the outside, the 
global financial crisis in 2008-2009 affected Taiwan’s export sector and 
slowed its economic growth down. Internally, the enormous flooding in 
August 2009 revealed Ma’s true administrative ability. Honouring the 
promise made during his presidential campaign (Ma and Siew 2007: 123) 
of bringing prosperity back to Taiwan increasingly appears to be a hercu-
                                                 
1 The research for this paper was based on several research visits to Taiwan: the 
visiting programme of the British Academy-Academia Sinica in December 2007, 
the National Chengchi University in December 2008 and the Institution of Political 
Science of the Academia Sinica in December 2009. I thank them all. I would also 
like to thank Jean-Pierre Cabestan, William A. Callahan, Chao Chien-Min, Dafydd 
Fell, Hsu Szu-chien, Kao Charng, Keng Shu, Peter N. S. Lee, Leng Tse-Kang, Shih 
Chih-Yu, Wu Chung-li, Wu Yu-Shan and Norman Yin for their comments, 
interviews, discussion and research support at various points during the research 
process. I would like to thank Gunter Schubert for his invitation to contribute to 
this special issue and for reading my entire paper and making some very useful 
comments on it. My gratitude also goes to the editors of the Journal of Current Chinese 
Affairs and to two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments 
concerning revisions. I would also like to thank the School of Government and 
International Affairs at Durham University for offering some financial support for 
the research. Thanks are also due to those people who kindly participated in 
interviews and discussion at the Mainland Affairs Council and the Straits Exchange 
Foundation as well as to various DPP members and many academic colleagues at 
the National Taiwan University, National Chengchi University, National Taiwan 
Normal University and Yuan Ze University. 
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lean task. In addition, the typhoon and flooding in August 2009 were a 
serious blow to Ma’s administration as his skill at crisis management was 
severely criticized (Zhongshi Dianzi Bao 2009). 
In July 2008 when regular direct flights were again in operation after 
an absence of 59 years, more than a hundred mainland Chinese tourists 
set foot in Taiwan for the very first time. On the political front, 
institutionalized dialogue has been re-opened between ARATS of China 
and the SEF of Taiwan, a dialogue that had stopped after Lee Teng-hui’s 
(Li Denghui) visit to his alma mater Cornell University in 1995 (see my 
argument in Cheung 2007: 113-116 as well). On 4 November 2008, Chen 
Yunlin, head of the ARATS, and Chiang Pin-kun (Jiang Bingkun), chair-
man of the SEF, met in Taiwan and took a historical step towards the 
future development of cross-Strait relations. In the second Chiang-Chen 
Talks, they signed agreements focusing on four issue areas: air transport, 
sea transport, postal services and food-safety security (MAC 2008a). 
In terms of indirect trade and investment, Taiwan exported a total 
of 6,197 million USD in goods to mainland China from 1988 to May 
2009 while importing only 1,848 million USD, resulting in a trade surplus 
of 4,349 million USD. In terms of investment, 37,311 cases of indirect 
investment from Taiwan to China were recorded from 1991 to May 2009 
with an overall value of 771 million USD (MAC 2009b). Yet compared 
with trade with the United States of America, for instance, the trade 
balance between Taiwan and the United States witnessed a steady de-
crease. Trade between Taiwan and the USA amounted to 11 billion USD 
in 2008, for example, compared with the trade balance of 16 billion USD 
in 2000 (a drop of almost a third in eight years) (US Census Bureau 
2009). So it can be argued that the decrease in Taiwan’s trade with the 
United States of America was compensated by the concurrent increase of 
trade with China. In so doing, it appears that rapid economic integration 
across the Taiwan Strait needs to be looked at from an economic angle 
as well as a political one. 
Across the Strait, during the Seventeenth National Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party (NCCCP) held from 15-21 October 2007, 
General Secretary Hu Jintao suggested that a peace agreement could be 
signed between China and Taiwan: 
Here we would like to make a solemn appeal: On the basis of the one-
China principle, let us discuss a formal end to the state of hostility be-
tween the two sides, reach a peace agreement, construct a framework 
for peaceful development of cross-Straits relations, and thus usher in 
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a new phase of peaceful development (Chinese Communist Party 
2007: 43).  
It was felt that Hu was trying to play a more active role in setting new 
rules of the game regarding cross-Strait impasses. Yet after Taiwan’s 
Legislative Yuan election in January 2008 and the presidential election in 
March 2008, the “peaceful” relationship became more obvious, resulting 
in a gradual, upbeat development. 
In terms of cross-Strait relations, however, there are two important 
catalysts of change that must not be neglected: Taiwanese identity and 
democratization. Identity searching and the notion of Taiwanese identity 
were often used during the DPP’s administration before 2008 because 
the political party tried to make use of Taiwanese identities to recon-
struct the political loyalty of the general public. Democratization in Tai-
wan also arouses a sense of national identity amongst the populace by 
using ethnicity as well as language to reconstruct a new political culture, 
which affects the political climate in Taiwan. The very notion of the 
meaning of identity is embedded in the country’s history, colonization 
development, ethnic composition, cross-Strait relations, political devel-
opment, democratization and nationalism (Cheung 2009a). 
As for democratization, the voting behaviour and the result of elec-
tions will continue to re-define Taiwan’s politics and help put cross-Strait 
relations in a constantly changing context. The local election in Decem-
ber 2009, for instance, was said to be an indicator that might reflect on 
the incumbent KMT, which was not doing well, either in terms of 
economics or politics. Although the KMT had gained 12 seats while the 
DPP only gained four, the percentage of votes for the KMT dropped 
significantly from 50.96 per cent in 2005 to 47.88 per cent in 2009, while 
the DPP, in contrast, increased from 41.95 per cent in 2005 to 45.32 per 
cent in 2009 (Xin Xinwen 2009: 13). 
It seems that the rise of China and the integration between China 
and Taiwan are now clear facts. One needs to think about the far-reach-
ing consequences of the intense integration between China and Taiwan. 
With the notion of “Chaiwan” in mind, I am going to apply a model to 
examine the outcomes and requirements of closer economic and political 
relations between Taiwan and China by referring to four dimensions: 
politics, business, culture and institution. These factors collectively allow 
one to derive a quadrangular analysis to extend the meaning of “Chai-
wan” and to further enquire about the challenges and opportunities of 
contemporary cross-Strait relations. 
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The Model of “Chaiwan” and the Implications for 
Cross-Strait Relations 
The economic platform between China and Taiwan has been built upon 
the economic rise of China as well as the flow of investment from Tai-
wan to China for the past two decades. China’s rise as a major economic 
and political player inevitably provides new possibilities for the future of 
cross-Strait relations (Naughton 1997; So, Lin, and Poston 2001; Calla-
han 2004; Sung 2005). Researchers who are looking at the economic 
integration between China and Taiwan particularly focus on Taiwanese 
investment, Taiwanese business people (taishang) and cross-Strait eco-
nomic and social interactions (Leng 1995; Bolt 2001; Tung 2003; Tanner 
2007).  
Figure 1: A Model of “Chaiwan” in Cross-Strait Relations 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
In the model, I am going to develop some possible approaches and areas 
of concern from the economic, social and cultural relations established 
between China and Taiwan. As a result of the rapid integration, it ap-
pears that, within the four dimensions just mentioned, there are four 
shaping factors that can help theorize the concept of “Chaiwan” by a 
quadrangular analysis of their interaction: guanxi, plutocracy, legalism and 
the Chinese Common Market. I shall attempt to demonstrate by this 
model that rapid economic integration between China and Taiwan will 
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be strongly affected by their cultural similarity as well as being challenged 
by their political differences. In order to enhance co-operation, it is ar-
gued, cross-Strait relations should be developed along the way of 
institutionalization to secure both sides’ interests in future economic co-
operation. 
Guanxi: Chinese Business Culture (Area A) 
Area A indicates the correlation between business and culture. Guanxi is 
an obvious, but very abstract term in a Chinese business and cultural 
context. It is a very broad concept and its significance is continuously 
debated by scholars who try to pinpoint elements that can explain the 
interaction behind business activities between two very similar cultures in 
a better way. Taiwanese and Chinese are said to be able to manipulate 
some common Chinese cultural traits such as business networks, lan-
guages, education and traditional customs in order to facilitate better 
business activities. These elements are useful to create a cultural platform 
for business activities to take place within “Chaiwan”. Yet, I argue that 
given the similarity of culture and the ability to speak the same language, 
the fact is that it is easy to generate guanxi, but increasingly difficult to 
develop trust in a close community such as “Chaiwan”. 
According to a comparative study on the investment strategies 
among taishang, Japanese businessmen and Korean businessmen in China, 
Chen Te-sheng pointed out that “Taishang have language, cultural and 
local knowledge, they are better in developing human networks and 
bridging relations with local government” (Chen 2008: 21). In so doing, 
speaking the same language – Mandarin – perpetuates the establishment 
of guanxi, or network-building, with Chinese local governments. His 
observation is very close to our conventional understanding of the no-
tion of socially constructed business culture or Chinese capitalism 
(Thuno 2007). 
Previous research on Chinese capitalism, among the Chinese dias-
pora especially, treats Chinese network-building as organic, suggesting 
the common cultural traits can facilitate such business network-building. 
Kao (1993) coined the concept of the “Chinese Commonwealth” to 
describe the business networks of this diaspora. In his survey of Chinese 
diaspora enterprises, 52 per cent of the respondents reported that more 
than half of their domestic working relations and 39 per cent of their 
international working relations were with co-ethnics. The study by Mak 
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and Kung on the formulation of Chinese diaspora networks indicated 
that such ties were multi-dimensional (Mak and Kung 1999), and they 
concluded that “the social network of the Chinese Diaspora works be-
yond a mere business-inducing medium […] it also serves as a feeler of 
social-political stability” (Mak and Kung 1999: 15). Yeung, in a some-
what similar fashion, argues that “local institutions and social norms 
have strongly shaped the emergence of Chinese capitalism in Southeast 
Asia, giving it a distinctive peculiarity and set of practices” (Yeung 1999: 
8). 
A more recent approach on Chinese business studies is the attempt 
to reconcile two strands of theories of Chinese diaspora business studies: 
“cultural dependency”, involving Chinese networks and family business; 
and “administrative heritage” (de-colonization and the socio-political 
system), where the Chinese diaspora attempt to find their place in the 
socio-economic environment of the host country (Dieleman 2007: 27-
28). This so-called “co-evolution theory” is an attempt to understand the 
balance that Chinese diaspora capitalists try to find between themselves, 
as ethnic minorities, and the socio-political environment they find them-
selves in. It is this balance that I intend to demonstrate with respect to 
the taishang and their business in China (see also Zhang 2007: 127-138). 
The notion of being Chinese provides an important condition for busi-
ness to take place. However, we have to take the respective local condi-
tions into consideration in order to understand their way of doing busi-
ness on the mainland. For example, in the cases of family food enter-
prises in the United Kingdom, their business development and the 
inevitable linkage between Chinese and the catering industry were actu-
ally subordinated under broader social and economic changes in the 
United Kingdom after the Second World War when many male family 
members enlisted in the army. As a result, female members needed to 
join the job market to fill the gaps in manpower, leaving a burgeoning 
catering service industry to be filled by different ethnic groups, one of 
which was the Chinese group (Gomez and Cheung 2009). According to 
a DPP legislator’s assistant,  
Taiwanese businesses and their concomitant investment behaviour, 
social relations and even extramarital affairs in China are somewhat a 
media-constructed topic. Due to the profit-making motive, they have 
to get along with the Chinese government, whether they like it or not 
(Interview, 13 December 2007, Taibei). 
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If this observation is true, as many people think, the generic cultural 
background, language advantage and local knowledge are one entity, but 
there is also a co-evolutionary notion of getting along with (or adapting 
to) the political system in China. In a similar fashion, Taiwanese business 
people, while adjusting themselves to the Chinese social and political 
environment through their business activities, have to maintain a differ-
ent identity. This is because they do not want to fully integrate into the 
Chinese political system or lose their Taiwanese identity. According to 
another DPP member,  
the identity of Taiwanese businessmen is very subtle. On the surface, 
they may seem to subordinate to the Chinese identity. But after a 
while, this Chinese identity can become a problem that may create a 
division between us (Taiwanese businessmen) and them (Chinese 
government officials). When they go back to Taiwan from Suzhou, 
for instance, they keep a low profile for fear of being labelled of 
speaking for China (Interview, 18 December 2007, Taibei). 
Apparently, the taishang are a very special group of people. Their net-
works are conditioned by their identity as well as by their liminal status 
(they change their attitude between two places) (Cheung 2007: 87-90). 
To take another example, language is important in defining one’s iden-
tity. Although Mandarin is used in mainland China as the formal lan-
guage, many people actually use different dialects – in Guangdong and 
Shanghai, for example. Whenever I paid visits to my grandfather’s village 
in Guangdong in the early 1980s, where people mainly spoke Cantonese, 
I remember seeing signs in stores that said Tongzhimen qing jiang putonghua 
(Comrades please speak Putonghua [Mandarin]) (see Cheung 2007: 98). In 
other words, the dual-language identity allows one to deal with the 
government by the use of the formal language, but to communicate with 
one’s local community in a dialect. In the case of Taiwan, according to 
Alan M. Wachman,  
the arrival of the KMT in Taiwan after the defeat by the CCP in 1949 
also brought the movement of purification of language, which meant 
Mandarin should be used as a formal language (Wachman 1994: 108).  
In the following decades, there were twists and turns between the status 
of Mandarin and taiyu (the principal Taiwanese language, which was sup-
pressed under the KMT’s language policy). But after the late 1980s espe-
cially, Taiwan became more liberal and therefore the status of taiyu was 
re-established. In 1987, three of the state television stations began to use 
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taiyu to broadcast news. In the 2000s under Chen Shui-bian’s (Chen 
Shuibian) administration, taiyu was given official status in connection 
with the rising of Taiwanese nationalism (Cheung 2007: 98-101). 
The role of language in identity formation in Taiwan has not been 
fully understood by most mainland Chinese, even since 2008. To take 
just one example, the plan to bring Cape No. 7 (a box-office hit Taiwan-
ese film with lots of taiyu) to China was hugely delayed because the love 
affairs between a young Japanese publicist and a Taiwanese singer were 
considered to be “too Taiwanese” as well as idolizing Japanese coloniza-
tion too much (Financial Times 2008: 4). As a matter of fact, taiyu is an 
element that creates a sense of community among Taiwanese business 
people. While taishang use the official language, Mandarin, to do business 
in China, their weak social and cultural entrenchment in mainland China 
(see below), except perhaps in Fujian, stands in opposition to the net-
work-building argument.  
Plutocracy: Chinese Business and Politics  
(Area B) 
Area B demonstrates the “coalition” between culture and politics be-
tween Taiwan and China. Interaction between the two countries has 
witnessed a general development regarding the possibility of plutocratic 
governance. The word plutocracy, or plutokratia in Greek, comes from 
ploutos (wealth) and kratein (to govern). 2  In its original meaning, it 
refers to “an elite of ruling class whose power derives from their wealth” 
(ODE 2003: 1356). Lien Chan’s (Lian Zhan) meeting with Hu Jintao in 
2005, for example, represented the elitist approach to the integration 
process as he was chairman of the KMT at the time. By the same token, 
Taiwan’s business people, who have economic power, also play a domi-
nant role in cross-Strait economic integration. Putting the wealthy and 
powerful Taiwanese together into a closed Chinese political system may 
generate outcomes that are not necessarily healthy because they can fur-
ther translate their economic power to reinforce their political capital in 
China. 
It is very likely that the rise of plutocracy in the process of increas-
ing “Chaiwan’s” integration is based on the “political business” relations 
                                                 
2 Thanks to my former colleague Bob Dyson for informing me of the origins of 
these words. 
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between the governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and the 
taishang. Political business is a concept 
which will be applied to analyse the various forms of links between 
politics and business that can have positive or negative impact on lo-
cal economies and political systems (Gomez 2002: 3).  
In a positive manner, government and business, through continuous 
cultivation of economic incentives, generate the linchpin of economic 
growth. In a negative fashion, politics and business relations may de-
velop into “patron-client” relations, as Lucian Pye has shown (Pye 1985: 
111-120). 
Lien Chan’s (Lian Zhan) visit to China in 2005 unveiled his incipient 
plutocracy. In the following years, more and more high-level KMT lead-
ers were able to go to China and visit top Chinese leaders, too. Prior to 
2008, these visits were symbolic rather than structural, but, as previously 
mentioned, both the Legislative Yuan and the Presidency in Taiwan are 
now controlled by the KMT. The notion of symbolic meaning is very 
likely to be worked out with the incumbent government to formulate a 
collective force in driving at further policy and political initiatives. What I 
am trying to develop further here is that a wealthy KMT party leader 
paying a visit to China is deemed to be worrying, but not entirely 
troublesome. More importantly, the assets of the KMT as a whole are a 
problem as it has been characterized as “KMT, Inc.”. Party assets were 
accumulated, at least in part, “on a foundation of nepotism, insider trad-
ing, political pat-ronage, and financial-sector abuse for vested political 
interests” (Fields 2002: 115). At some point during the 1990s, the KMT’s 
assets were valued at 36 billion NTD (1.44 billion USD) and Liu Taiying, 
chairman of KMT’s Party-Owned Enterprise Management Committee, 
admitted that “the actual market value of the KMT’s corporate holdings 
may be three times that of the book value” (Fields 2002: 123). Although 
Ma has been trying to clarify the legal status of the KMT’s assets, return-
ing some of them to the government, his efforts have not been entirely 
successful; the legality of the KMT’s financial empire is still an issue. It is 
under such circumstances that the intermingling of KMT power and 
wealth with the interests of top Chinese leaders raises the question of 
whether a new cross-Strait plutocracy is emerging. 
Second, Taiwanese business leaders play a role in nurturing such a 
plutocracy as well. For the past two decades, taishang investment in China 
has been repeatedly knocked as hollowing out the economic strength of 
Taiwan. In June 2005, for instance, CommonWealth magazine questioned 
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whether the taishang were still loyal to Taiwan (CommonWealth 2005). Six 
of the ten biggest foreign investors in mainland China were from Taiwan 
at the time. The fact is, as the magazine warned, that the very latest 
development of taishang engagement in China is the employment of 
Chinese bureaucrats; the taishang do not even rely on human capital from 
Taiwan any more (CommonWealth 2005: 86). Many policies, such as the 
“three mini links” (xiaosantong), were biased towards the taishang at the 
very beginning. The Act of Offshore Island Development (Lidao jianshe 
tiaoli) was promulgated in the Legislative Yuan on 21 March 2000. One 
of the key requirements of being able to use offshore islands – Jinmen, 
for instance – to travel to China was  
being the responsible person or an employee of an enterprise that is 
permitted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs to invest in the 
Mainland Area, or the spouse or a lineal blood relative of the said 
responsible person or employee (Jiang 2007: 55). 
From the point of view of Taiwanese society, as my previous interview-
ing in Taiwan has shown, the continuous investment by Taiwanese busi-
ness people in China is very likely to divide the islanders into two 
groups: the haves and have-nots. The haves (i.e. the taishang) are those 
people who have been investing heavily in China and have attained eco-
nomic as well as political capital. The have-nots are those people who do 
not or could not invest in China. These people feel that their economic 
opportunity and international space have been restrained. The only 
power they have is their political vote, which has very often led to 
nationalistic overtones in Taiwan’s political discourse since the mid-
2000s. In addition, according to Wu, taishang investment in China has 
both positive and negative effects in terms of employment. Furthermore, 
as a result of their investment in China, taishang can create some middle-
management jobs for Taiwanese, who can return to Taiwan later to work 
at the middle-management level. On the negative side, though, a large 
number of blue-collar jobs will be shifted to mainland China to be taken 
up by local manpower.  
It thus appears that the idea of plutocracy has recently gained 
momentum. After the financial crisis erupted in September 2008 in Wall 
Street, for instance, Beijing immediately pledged 130 billion CNY (19 
billion USD) in loans to Taiwanese business people to help China over-
come the crisis (Clem 2008: 1). The director of the mainland’s Taiwan 
Affairs Office, Wang Yi, and the chairman of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference, Jia Qingling, agreed on the impor-
  New Approaches to Cross-Strait Integration 23
 

 
tance of the help and the urgency of the loans (Clem 2008). This obvi-
ously served the Chinese “United Front” (tongzhang) strategy well, but 
more than that, it underlines the relevance of plutocracy in contemporary 
cross-Strait relations and has therefore caused observers to express a 
string of concerns (Gomez 2002). The formation of governmental 
plutocracy will require years to take shape. Since 2008, Taiwan’s media 
has become increasingly active in covering such topics as cross-Strait 
economic benefits, middle-of-the-range mainland officials coming to 
Taiwan and nouveau riche mainland tourists spending time in Taiwan 
(Yuanjing Zazhi 2009).  
Legalism: Institutionalization of Chinese Politics 
(Area C) 
In area C of the diagram, the intermingling between a democratic Taiwan 
and an authoritarian one-party state in China creates tension and re-
straints. To promote healthy integration, it is necessary to promote legal 
institutionalization, which means interaction should be based on a clear, 
institutionalized structure. As mentioned before, the directors of the 
ARATS and SEF met in Taiwan on 4 November 2008, paving the way 
for deeper cross-Strait relations. After this meeting (known as the Sec-
ond Chiang-Chen Talks), the Mainland Affairs Council in Taiwan came 
up with a comprehensive survey which showed that 75.1 per cent of the 
respondents agreed that both Taiwan and China should work on food 
safety and combating crime, 57.4 per cent said the Chinese government 
should protect taishang, 51.4 per cent supported the establishment of a 
common industrial standard, 46.4 per cent wanted to see cross-Strait 
finance, stocks and future markets developed further, 44.1 per cent 
found that more exchange with students and media workers should be 
encouraged and 39.4 per cent opted for the introduction of fishery co-
operation (MAC 2008b: 6). In other words, the up-and-coming need in 
“Chaiwan” is to establish a better legal/ institutional framework for vari-
ous exchanges and activities between Taiwan and China. This is to an-
chor and facilitate deeper co-operation between the two nations and to 
actually secure both sides’ interest by setting up a workable mechanism. 
Such talks continued. On 26 April 2009, the Third Chiang-Chen 
Talks were held in China. Three major agreements were signed:  
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1. the Cross-Strait Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance 
Agreement,  
2. the Cross-Strait Financial Cooperation Agreement, and  
3. the Cross-Strait Air Transport Supplementary Agreement.  
These agreements collectively amount to a basis for further economic 
integration. However, it appears that all these agreements are based on 
“consensus”-building between Taiwan and mainland China. From the 
Taiwanese point of view, the SEF declared that: 
The Taiwan side earnestly welcomes Mainland investment in Taiwan. 
It will as speedily as possible announce related regulations and ancil-
lary measures, and in orderly sequence gradually expand the opening 
of investment spheres, continuing to carry out related tasks and help-
ing solve problems stemming from investment, to facilitate Mainland 
investment in Taiwan (MAC 2009a: 31). 
On the other side of the Strait, the mainland ARATS declared the 
following in a similar fashion, which is also a “consensus” understanding: 
The Mainland side will actively support investment by Mainland 
enterprises in Taiwan. It will encourage qualified Mainland enterprises 
to carry out field investigations in Taiwan, to understand the invest-
ment environment and seek investment opportunities. On the basis as 
promulgated in related regulations, it will provide facilitation for 
strong and competitive Mainland enterprises to invest in Taiwan 
(MAC 2009a: 31-32). 
As far as these two statements are concerned, they demonstrate that 
both governments are trying to establish an institutionalized way of 
building a consensus. The statement from mainland China obviously 
seems more cautious, though, which suggests a water-testing initiative. In 
other words, many detailed regulations are needed urgently in order to 
place their economic relations under a legal framework with strong 
protection and workable enforcement.  
Given that Taiwan is enjoying more and more investment and trade 
with China, institutionalization should be strengthened to protect both 
sides. Private property rights were included in the amendment of the 
Chinese constitution in 2007, for example. This helped institutionalize 
the constitution’s legal basis and contractual agreements. But in many 
areas such as intellectual property rights (IPR), state-level and interna-
tional agreements – most notably under Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) with the World Trade Organization 
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(WTO) or World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) – have not 
been implemented properly in China (Cheung 2009b). Understandably, 
the extension of IPR protection covering Taiwan’s investment is a neces-
sary step to place a standardized legal-protection framework within 
“Chaiwan”. Seeing as Taiwan and China are both members of the WTO, 
their IPR disputes (on copyrights especially) ought to be carried out 
within the framework of TRIPS (Liu 2002). There is, indeed, a need to 
develop a healthy contractual and legal basis to drive economic, cultural 
and social integration across the Taiwan Strait forward.  
On 22 December 2009, the directors of the ARATS and SEF both 
took part in the Fourth Chiang-Chen Talks in Taizhong. Three major 
accords were signed as a result (the fourth agreement about double taxa-
tion was withdrawn at the last minute due to some technical details that 
were not fully understood). These were  
1. the Cross-Strait Agreement on Cooperation of Agricultural Product 
Quarantine and Inspection,  
2. the Cross-Strait Agreement on Cooperation in Respect of Standards, 
Metrology, Inspection and Accreditation, and 
3. the Cross-Strait Agreement on Cooperation in Respect of Fishing 
Crew Affairs. 
Although they are still agreements based on consensus, such details be-
hind these legally binding documents further anchored a systematic 
mechanism that could be used between two governments to facilitate 
future legalization and institutionalization of cross-Strait relations (Jingji 
Ribao 2009: A2).  
Speaking about the role of the taishang in cross-Strait relations, a 
well-known Taiwanese businessman indicated some new trends in 
taishang investment, which not only touched upon some obvious invest-
ment projects, but also some less obvious social and cultural investment 
developments. According to this person, Taiwanese business people are 
now trying to branch out, although they are not developing vertically or 
horizontally; they are actually moving into the hospital industry and the 
educational sector (Interview, 4 January 2009, Taibei). 
This may not make much sense from a purely business point of 
view or from a Western business perspective, but actually the linkage 
between business and education is enormous within Taiwan. There are 
quite a number of private Taiwanese universities there (although the 
government subsidizes them) that are owned and funded by a number of 
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large businesses. Take I-Shou University, Yuan Ze University, Shih Hsin 
University, Tatung University and Chang Jung Christian University, for 
example. For those taishang who are now investing in primary or secon-
dary schools in China, this is simply a way of helping their own children 
to study in China, as many of them do not want their children to study at 
local Chinese schools or they think these are not competitive enough 
(Yazhou Zhoukan 2004: 48-49). If this is something related to the Chinese 
Confucian tradition by linking up the economic sector with the social 
and cultural ones, then a more standardized legal requirement is needed 
to institutionalize the ways in which such practices can be translated into 
public policy with a certain level of governance. 
Two very salient issues have come to the fore in Taiwan resulting 
from taishang investment: welfare and the family. Both must be tackled 
by legal institutionalization. In his research on the implementation of 
pension insurance in two Chinese cities, Kunshan and Wenzhou, where 
a large number of taishang reside, Chiou Ming Je has shown how the 
responsibility to provide for a comprehensive pension system to benefit 
workers was passed to local governments by the central authorities. In 
both cities, where Taiwanese business people are the main investors, this 
responsibility was shifted to the taishang. Yet the interlocking interest 
between the local governments of these two cities and the taishang 
eventually circumvented the implementation of a welfare system, either 
by substantially reducing the necessary coverage for the pension-insur-
ance system or just paying lip-service to its importance (Chiou 2007: 53-
58).  
Finally, the moving of Taiwanese business people to China has 
placed considerable stress on family life in Taiwan. In a recent study, 
Shen Hsiu-hua carefully illustrated these tensions (Shen 2005). Given 
that cross-Strait economic integration is steadily intensifying, she argued:  
What I emphasize here is that the larger gendered and sexualized 
process of the cross-Strait economic development is structurally un-
friendly toward both Taiwanese and Chinese women (Shen 2005: 
433). 
It is expected that after direct linkage has been implemented, a clear-cut 
immigration policy will be developed regarding Taiwanese business peo-
ple and their families. In addition, cross-Strait travelling can also be regu-
lated in a more sophisticated manner. 
The rapid rise of “Chaiwan” is mainly driven by top-down policies 
from both governments. Yet as Douglass North has mentioned,  
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although formal rules may change overnight as the result of political 
or judicial decisions, informal constraints embodied in customs, tradi-
tions, and codes of conduct are much more impervious to deliberate 
policies. These cultural constraints not only connect the past with the 
present and future but provide us with a key to explaining the path of 
historical change (North 1990: 6).  
It is therefore undeniable that legal institutionalization between Taiwan 
and China requires time and appropriate policies to accomplish. 
The Chinese Common Market: Institutionalization 
of Chinese Business (Area D)  
Area D refers to a situation that can be called an ideal type of environ-
ment in which business activities can be pursued normally and proper 
institutions are in place. This can be tentatively termed a Chinese “Com-
mon Market”. The legal system, commercial law and government regula-
tions have reached a high standard. Such a Common Market allows for-
eign direct investment, joint ventures and even human movement be-
tween China and Taiwan to be conducted within a politically accepted 
framework. Therefore, if a Chinese Common Market can be worked out 
in such a way, a more institutionalized policy platform can be derived for 
cross-Strait relations.  
The idea of creating a Chinese Common Market was originally sug-
gested by Ma Ying-jeou (Ma Yingjiu), Taiwan’s President, and Vincent 
Siew (Xiao Wanchang), its Vice-President (Ma and Siew 2007). When 
asked about the idea of a Chinese Common Market, Siew replied: 
The idea of a Chinese Common Market is based on an equal status to 
share the market that created between 23 million Taiwanese people 
and 1.3 billion Chinese people. It is based on the European Union’s 
idea of a Common Market, which means economic integration can be 
deepened while political autonomy can be maintained. Agreements 
could be based on negotiation […] Alternatively, a Chinese Common 
Market could also refer to a Greater China Market, including Hong 
Kong and Macau (Ma and Siew 2007: 156-159).  
Speaking about Taiwanese business people in this context, we may ask if 
institutionalized taishang activities work in favour of the establishment of 
a Chinese Common Market. Based on substantial fieldwork conducted 
between 2004 and 2007 by Keng Shu and Lin Rui-Hua on the roles and 
functions of Taiwanese business associations (TBAs) in China, the pic-
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ture is not entirely promising. Contrary to many established ideas, their 
first main finding was that Taiwanese business associations are not 
strong organizations; they are actually quite weak and fragmented. Sec-
ond, being a member of an association does not result in any direct 
benefits for the taishang businesses. It is necessary to build up guanxi 
further with some like-minded people inside the local governments in 
order to facilitate business operations. Third, the associations are actually 
at the mercy of the Chinese government, which does not want the 
associations to become too big or too vocal (Keng and Lin 2007: 115-
124). The influence of taishang in strengthening the development of a 
Chinese Common Market is still minimal. 
Let’s now take a look at one recent example of the idea of creating 
an international financial centre in China. As far as financial globalization 
is concerned, money transcends geographical boundary and sometimes 
dissolves sovereignty. According to Benjamin Cohen,  
currency spaces now are shaped not by political sovereignty but by 
the invisible hand of competition-governments interacting together 
with societal actors in the social spaces created by money’s transac-
tional networks (Cohen 1998: 5). 
Financial globalization therefore constitutes a good basis for the 
development of a common market. As a result, the confirmation by the 
State Council in China to formally endorse Shanghai as China’s interna-
tional financial centre by 2020 will certainly affect economic relations 
across the Strait. This is a strategic move and part of the Chinese govern-
ment’s general strategy to secure more autonomy from the global finan-
cial leadership of the United States of America. In addition, this move 
gives rise to some new opportunities and challenges vis-à-vis Chinese 
societies, especially Hong Kong and Taiwan (Cheung 2010).  
In the case of financial development and the cross-border move-
ment of financial capital, Taiwan is hoping to be able to tap into the 
financial development arising from the opening up of the Chinese finan-
cial sector and the increasing economic integration across the Taiwan 
Strait. As soon as Shanghai had been confirmed as China’s international 
financial centre, it began to recruit global talents in financial sectors as 
well as various managers and other professionals. For instance, two sepa-
rate recruitment fairs were launched in November and December 2009 
in the United States of America, Europe, Canada and Singapore respec-
tively. As a result, more than 286 professionals were recruited (Jingji Ri-
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bao 2009). In view of this, it is tempting for Taiwan to tap into the Chi-
nese market by providing some human resources in these sectors. 
According to the Global Financial Centres Index 5 (2009), Hong 
Kong, Shanghai, Beijing and Taibei were all considered as financial cen-
tres, but with a different emphasis and importance. Hong Kong was 
ranked fourth, Shanghai 35th, Taibei 41st and Beijing 51st (GFCI5 2009: 
4). Interestingly, this is the first year that the Index has ever placed Taibei 
among other more established financial centres in mainland China. The 
growth of these cities reinforces the future rise of China in the interna-
tional financial system, but complicates it at the same time. Their divi-
sion of labour, functions and government-back-up style constitute a 
long-term future challenge to the current international financial system 
that is based on market force. Taibei has to play increasingly important 
roles with respect to Taiwanese business people, who have invested a 
great deal of time and money in China. Also, given the recent trade and 
economic talks between China and Taiwan, Taibei is trying to regain the 
market by offering financial products to Taiwanese business people and 
facilitating their investments. Yet academia still remains sceptical about 
Taibei’s financial role and importance. Professor Norman Yin, who is 
Director of the Centre for Asia-Pacific Monetary Studies at National 
Chengchi University in Taiwan, commented on Taibei being a financial 
centre as follows: 
After 1989, the discussion of Taiwan’s financial roles emerged be-
cause of the increasing size of the capital in Taiwan due to its indus-
trial development and export. Opening Taiwan’s financial market and 
enhancing its financial centre were actually aimed at providing a 
framework for internal financial regulation for the local banking 
industries […] Taibei is far from being an international financial cen-
tre. Taibei may be a regional financial centre, which very much de-
pends on the co-ordination between Hong Kong and China. It may 
be able to perform a better role for Chinese financial and capital mar-
kets. But, traditionally, Taiwan has a very good financial relationship 
with Japan. Therefore, Taibei and Tokyo have already established a 
workable relationship in terms of financial matters (Interview, 5 Janu-
ary 2009, Taibei). 
Apparently, if Taibei is working alone, it is not ready yet as far as the 
openness and financial infrastructure are concerned. Yet its regional 
financial function and roles in the greater China region may be very 
different if we take taishang and cross-Strait economic integration into 
  30 Gordon C. K. Cheung 
 
consideration. According to Kao Charng, Deputy Director of the 
Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan,  
Taiwan is expecting to be more active in international finance. But, in 
the Asian Pacific region, it has been challenged by Hong Kong, To-
kyo and Singapore. Even Shanghai is moving very quickly. There are 
quite a number of successful taishang. They can be the targets of Tai-
wan’s financial future […] But, Taiwan remains weak in terms of 
liberalization and internationalization. It is too conservative (Inter-
view, 18 December 2009, Taibei). 
Neither the academic workers nor the policy-makers are entirely satisfied 
with Taibei’s financial future, which is understandable given the chal-
lenges from many other financial cities. Nevertheless, a recent paper has 
suggested that the correlation between Taiwan’s long-term economic 
growth and economic development is actually very positive. In a study of 
Taiwan’s economic growth and economic development from 1962 to 
1998 conducted by Chang Tsangyao and Steven Caudill using a four-
variable VAR model, the authors conclude that  
[t]here is a high degree of confidence that the development of the 
financial sector and the promotion of the exports are effective policies 
towards promoting Taiwan’s economic growth (Chang and Caudill 
2005: 1334).  
The correlation, of course, is one thing that strongly indicates the eco-
nomic trend for Taiwan.  
However, a Chinese Common Market would need a framework to 
begin with. This is why the Economic Cooperation Framework Agree-
ment (ECFA) became the talk of the town in Taiwan in 2009. Basically, 
this is a framework agreement between China and Taiwan over trade and 
economic affairs. Its aims are as follows: 
1. Normalization of cross-Strait economic relations. 
2. Prevention of Taiwan from being “marginalized” in the regionaliza-
tion of East Asia. China is a rising economic power. It is good to 
use it as a platform to stay with the economic growth. 
3. Internationalization of Taiwan and integration of Taiwan’s economy 
in the world economy (Liang’an Jingmou Yuekan 2009: 10-12). 
The Taiwanese business sectors are waiting for the ECFA to be signed 
because its contents include trade (tariff and non-tariff barrier reduction), 
early harvest, servicing, insurance, economic co-operation and dispute 
resolution (Liang’an Jingmou Yuekan 2009: 10-12). Yet the Taiwanese 
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government is concerned about the political consequences. Worse still, 
the DPP may even consider it to be having a negative impact on Tai-
wan’s domestic economic sector. This is a hot potato in the current 
political/ economic relations between China and Taiwan. Understanda-
bly, the signing of the ECFA will have top priority at the Fifth Chiang-
Chen Talks; its political impact will certainly be the main topic of debate 
between the KMT and the DPP in the immediate future. Together with 
the previous discussion over Taiwan’s financial status in the greater 
China region, “Chaiwan” is making progress in terms of economic 
integration. This is partly due to the opening up of the Chinese market 
and the normalization of cross-Strait relations after 2008 as well as the 
increasing economic integration achieved in 2009. Yet the infancy of 
Taiwan’s financial infrastructure is still hindering financial integration 
between China and Taiwan. The signing of the ECFA will be scrutinized 
carefully by both governments and the general public in China and Tai-
wan. To be realistic, it will take a very long time for the Chinese Com-
mon Market to take shape, not to mention facilitate further political 
integration across the Strait.  
Conclusion 
From a historical viewpoint, economic integration between Taiwan and 
China has been established along a truncated path that has fluctuated 
between speculation, hostility and chaos (especially since the 1996 missile 
crisis). From a mainstream international relations perspective, the 
increasing importance of economic affairs in the Taiwan Strait can be 
understood in security terms, which means that economic power and 
relationships can be translated into ways of improving the state’s capacity 
(Mastanduno 1998). Such an argument, which was frequently made in 
the 1990s, paints a negative picture of China hollowing out Taiwan’s 
economy. Yet as William Callahan has maintained, the relations within 
Greater China  
are not merely state-to-state diplomacy or patterns of international 
trade and investment, but involve less formal people-to-people rela-
tions, flows and disjunctures in a transnational political economy 
(Callahan 2004: xix).  
Such an idea is especially useful in explaining taishang investment in 
mainland China. Their investment and their “Chineseness” combine to 
formulate their business identity. 
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By putting the neologism of “Chaiwan” in a conceptual context, this 
article has attempted to diagnose the current rapid economic integration 
between China and Taiwan so as to generate a better picture of it in four 
possible areas: guanxi, plutocracy, legalism and the Chinese Common 
Market. These areas are helpful in understanding the various outcomes 
of intensifying economic and political interaction between China and 
Taiwan. Communist China is being challenged by an open and democ-
ratic Taiwan, which is currently governed by the KMT. Besides taking 
the historical experiences of the CCP and the KMT into account, the 
rapid economic interaction between Taiwan and China is also a testing 
ground to probe the institutionalization process of their business and 
economic activities. 
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